

AN EXECUTIVE MANAGER FOR NAVAL  
COMMUNICATIONS

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# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

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# THESIS

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AN EXECUTIVE MANAGER  
FOR  
NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS

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for  
Naval Communications

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## ABSTRACT

The Commander Naval Communications Command has been designated as the Executive Manager for Naval Communications throughout the Department of the Navy. None the less, mere designation has not gained complete acceptance or understanding of his role. At least part of the problem appears to be the title "Executive Manager" itself. This thesis attempts to define that title and explore the authority and responsibility relationships inherent or implied in such a title.

The thesis discusses a brief history of communications management, defines the term "Executive Manager" and describes the need for such an individual in the Navy. The present organization for communications in the Navy is contrasted with Army and Air Force organizations. Finally the authority and responsibility relationships are discussed and conclusions are drawn which describe what is considered to be the best form and positioning for an Executive Manager.





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## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. BACKGROUND

All organizations undergo change. In recent years the organization of the United States Navy has undergone dramatic change. This change has been seen in both the structure of the organization and in the titles applied to various segments of the organization. Unfortunately change is not always accepted and at times it is simply not understood. Bureaucratic organizations seem to stand for rigid rules and regulations, a hierarchy of offices, impersonality and resistance to change. The ability to cope with change in the Navy is complicated by factors of geography and the multiple eschelons of command which impose a natural communications filter between the highest levels where members of the organization assume change is conceived, and the lowest levels where it must be dealt with. As further evidence of complication, Webster defines "bureaucracy" as "the administration of government through departments and subdivisions managed by sets of officials following an inflexible routine." The words inflexible routine imply the lack of change. None the less, change has occurred in Navy organization.

One manifestation of this is the evolutionary process which has taken place in naval communications since the establishment of the post of Superintendent, Naval Radio Service in 1912. This process has followed the technological changes that have taken place in communications since the early days of wireless. In recent years the expansion of communications in the United States can best be described as explosive. The cost of



communications in the military accounts for a large portion of the defense budget. It has been estimated that more than nine billion dollars has been invested in communications systems and equipment, and that annual expenditures for communications support exceed five billion dollars [Ref. 20, p. 20].

The expansion of communications to this degree has not been without changes in the mode of operation and management or a lack of public notice and examination. Among the salient events of recent years which exemplify or show the need for increased emphasis on the role of communications management are the following:

- a. The establishment of a Telecommunications Advisor in the office of the President of the United States.
- b. The establishment of Telecommunications committees in both houses of Congress, reflecting the interest of the electorate in communications-electronics programs of the federal government.
- c. The establishment of a National Communications System by Executive Order, consisting of a confederation of the communications systems of Federal Departments and Agencies.
- d. The establishment within the Department of Defense of:
  - (1) A Defense Communications System under a Defense Communications Agency to provide for the world-wide communications and information exchange requirements of all Department of Defense users.
  - (2) A Joint Tactical Communication office to coordinate development of joint tactical communications systems and equipment.



(3) An Assistant Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications) to act as the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense on Telecommunications matters and for the National Communications System and also to have primary staff responsibility for the World-Wide Military Command and Control System.

e. The spectacular achievements of NASA telecommunications in space exploration including world-wide exploitation of telecommunications programs from the moon and deep space probes.

f. The near-revolutionary, government and industry-wide computer connected programs which increasingly require the integration of and transmission of information with data processing and data management into one telecommunications/teleprocessing field of endeavor.

g. The tragic failures of the Defense Communications System which were associated with the USS Liberty incident in June 1967, the USS Pueblo loss in January 1968 and the EC-121 loss in April 1969.

Factors such as these, the enormous dollar investment, and the vital necessity to maintain responsive communications while operating in a nuclear environment have produced Congressional pressure for DOD and the individual services to speak with one voice in matters relating to communications. Toward this end, a Naval Communications Command was established by the Secretary of the Navy on 1 July 1967 [Ref. 37]. In furtherance of this the Chief of Naval Operations defined the mission of the Naval Communications Command in OPNAV NOTICE 5450 of 24 May 1967 and later in OPNAV NOTICE 5450 of 24 June 1968. In May of 1971,





the Chief of Naval Operations refined the mission and functions of the Commander, Naval Communications Command in OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5450.184. In this document, the Commander, Naval Communications Command (COMNAVCOMM) is assigned the mission to serve as the Executive Manager throughout the Department of the Navy.

## B. NEED FOR THIS STUDY

Although the intention of this sweeping assignment seems clear on the surface, it appears that at various levels throughout the Department of the Navy the term Executive Manager is not understood and the authority and responsibility relationships inherent or implied in the title are not accepted. Indeed, the idea for a thesis to examine the need for an Executive Manager for Naval Communications was generated at the Naval Communications Command headquarters level. It was suggested that the term Executive Manager is not defined and has an ambiguous connotation. For example, the term is not found in JCS Pub 1, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, nor in Webster's Dictionary. Additionally a brief examination of Department of the Navy organization manuals and key personnel charts illustrates the complexity of the problem when one observes the numerous titles which imply some degree of communications policy-level authority and responsibility. This condition not only complicates the problem of acceptance of the authority and responsibility of the one Executive Manager throughout the Navy, but severely hampers the Navy ability to obtain adequate funding for essential communications systems.



## C. PURPOSE

It is the primary purpose of this thesis to define the term Executive Manager and the authority and responsibility relationships inherent or implied in the title. Also, the need for an Executive Manager for Naval Communications will be discussed. Secondly, since no single source provides it, this thesis is intended to provide an outline of the existing structure for communications in the Department of the Navy. It is anticipated that the thesis will then be of use to Communications Managers, both novice and with several years experience.

## D. METHODOLOGY

In order to achieve the intended purpose of this thesis the following procedure will be followed. First a brief history of the development of naval communications management will be given, culminating in the designation of COMNAVCOMM as Executive Manager. Second, the term Executive Manager will be defined and the need for such a manager will be discussed. Third, the organization of the Navy will be examined with emphasis placed on the various commands or offices involved in communications matters. Comparisons with Army and Air Force organizations will be offered. Finally, by drawing on current management literature as well as the foundation established in the preceeding steps, the authority and responsibility relationships inherent or implied in the office, Executive Manager for naval communications, will be discussed.



## II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT

### A. ORIGIN AND EARLY HISTORY

When did it all begin? When radio was still a wild idea, when the flag lieutenant was actually in charge of flags. It all started when Guglielmo Marconi came to the United States in 1899 to send on the scene reports of the America Cup race to the New York Herald. The U. S. Navy, at the request of the Chief of the Bureau of Equipment, appointed a board of four officers to witness and report on the operation of the Marconi equipment. Marconi's radio reporting of the races was a complete success and he was invited to demonstrate his equipment to the U. S. Navy. At this time a U. S. Navy Wireless Telegraph Board was appointed to investigate the equipment which was to be tested in the USS New York, USS Massachusetts and USS Porter. The first radio message was transmitted from the USS New York on 2 November 1899. The Wireless Telegraph Board recommended the system be given a trial by the Navy and an offer was made to Marconi to purchase 20 sets of the equipment. Marconi countered with an offer to lease the equipment which the Navy refused. From that time until late 1902 the Navy sat on the side-line and watched. In 1902 the Wireless Telegraph board was again convened to select the best suited equipment from four European firms. The initial selection was made and the U. S. Navy entered the radio world.

In 1903 the Radio Division of the Bureau of Equipment was established. A school was formed in the Brooklyn Navy Yard to provide instruction in



radio operation and maintenance and "Instructions for the Use of Wireless Telegraph Apparatus" were prepared and issued. By 1905, as the number of ships equipped with radio equipment steadily grew, the Wireless Telegraph Board was disbanded and the Radio Division of the Bureau of Equipment remained the sole agency to decide on matters concerning radio.

This single handed grip on communications matters was lost in 1908 when the U. S. Navy Radio Research laboratory was established. Research was vitally necessary to a sound expansion of naval communications. But a problem was created. With this act authority and responsibility conflicts began to appear since both agencies could recommend on the adequacy of radio equipment. In fact one of the U. S. Navy Radio Research Laboratory's first acts was to recommend against the purchase of a specific type of equipment. As a result the installation of continuous wave transmitters was delayed four years. As further example Captain Howeth, in his detailed account of Naval Communications [Ref. 5, p. 61], states that:

"One of the greatest deterrents to the early rapid development of naval communications was the lack of a close knit organization. Ashore, the stations were under the military command of the commandant of the naval yard or station closest to them. Operationally they were responsible both to that commandant and to the Chief of the Bureau of Equipment, through the head of its Radio Division. Afloat they were militarily and operationally responsible to the senior commander, via the chain of command."

Later, it will be pointed out that even to this day the communications stations are still operated under a dual leadership. In fact, those stations with Defense Communications Agency functions must be responsive to three commanders.





In 1910 the Bureau of Equipment was dissolved and the responsibility for radio was transferred to the Bureau of Steam Engineering, as unlikely as that may seem. In 1912 the office of Superintendent of Naval Radio Service was established under the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation for the purpose of operating and administering government radio stations. Material and budgetary functions remained with the Bureau of Steam Engineering. The year 1916 witnessed the further refinement of communications management when U. S. Naval General Order 236 directed the establishment of the Naval Communications Service headed by a Director. The Director, Naval Communications, was attached to the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. It is interesting to note, that no mission was assigned to the Naval Communications Service, but the duties of the Director were contained in the "Communications Regulations for the United States Navy, 1918." The duties, quoted by Howeth [Ref. 5, p. 234], of the Director reflected the conditions that existed at that time, but they also foretold the future organization.

"In the administration of all means of communication he will have general charge of their operation, personnel, organization, administration, etc., and in fact everything which has to do with the Communications Service of the Navy, except material."

"Except material," -- it seems hard to imagine the president of RCA, ITT, or Western Union operating their companies under similar conditions. However, it was on this basis that Naval Communications has grown. Essentially the Director of Naval Communications (DNC) was an operator. He had only limited influence on the material resources with which he was



to operate. The agencies which supplied equipment did not have to operate it. This fragmentation of responsibility began in the earliest stages of Naval Communications history and has continued until the present. While charged in broad and general terms for all matters relating to communications the bounds of the office have been clearly limited by the existence of a substantial influence in communication matters by the Naval Material Command.

#### B. THE EMERGENCE OF COMNAVCOMM

The title Director, Naval Communications continued until 1959 when the dual role of Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Communications)/Director, Naval Communications was assigned. The mission spelled out his requirement to act as the single communications executive for CNO and as such he was advisor, coordinator, provider, implementor, and operator within the Navy on all matters involving naval communications, for command and control. Simultaneously, the Naval Communications System Headquarters was established to carry out the management responsibilities of the ACNO (COMM)/DNC. Through the early 1960's the organization remained relatively static. However, developments external to the Department of the Navy such as establishing the Defense Communications System (1960) and the National Communications System (1962) and increased emphasis on concepts of centralized command and control were conditions which would necessitate a further modification of communications management.



It was at this point that the present Naval Communications Command was formed. The guidance given at that time by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations [Ref. 25], was that as many operating functions as feasible should be removed from the CNO staff. He further stated that:

"...the charter of the Commander Naval Communications Command should not be limited to command support and field activities. The Director of Naval Communications is concerned also with several other tasks, e.g., satisfying the communications needs for ships and shore activities Navy-wide. To the greatest extent practicable, the Commander, Naval Communications Command rather than the ACNO(COMM) should carry out those functions. This is somewhat parallel to the fact that overall Navy military personnel management matters are done by the Chief of Naval Personnel rather than by OP-01."

Accordingly, the Naval Communications Command and the Naval Communications Command Headquarters were established effective 1 July 1967 to carry out the tasks outlined by the VCNO.

Some confusion has developed over the SECNAV NOTICES involved in this establishment. SECNAV NOTICE 5450 serial 486 of 19 April 1967 has as its subject "Headquarters, Naval Communications Command; establishment of." It establishes a shore (field) activity assigned to the Chief of Naval Operations for command, effective 1 July 1967. It speaks only to the Headquarters. The second notice, SECNAV NOTICE 5450 serial 487 of 19 April 1967 has as its subject "Naval Communications Command; activation of." Reference 21, Annex A, Appendix I, p. 2, suggests that:

"This notice did not repeat the "shore (field) activity" status of the Command, nor did it use the expression "assigned to the Chief of Naval Operations for command." This second SECNAV NOTICE of the same day announced that "the Naval Communications Command, under



"a Commander reporting directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, shall be activated 1 July 1967." The change in emphasis between these two NOTICES is subtle, but meaningful."

On the surface this implies some form of skulduggery was afoot -- as though an effort was underway to delimit the authority of the Commander Naval Communications Command by those issuing the notices. The change in emphasis is indeed meaningful, but not at all subtle. It seems to have escaped the author of the report, that the two notices deal with different subjects, the Naval Communications Command and the Headquarters, Naval Communications Command. The Naval Communications Command is larger, or should be, than just its Headquarters. In fact, the second notice clearly states the Naval Communications Command shall comprise a "Headquarters and assigned shore (field) activities." In the broad case the man and his mission to exercise authority, under the policy guidance of the Chief of Naval Operations, over the readiness and operating efficiency of naval communications throughout the Department of the Navy described. In the other case the Headquarters organization which will serve the man in the execution of his mission is discussed. This position is supported by OPNAV NOTICE 5450 of 29 June 1968 which repeats the mission of Commander Naval Communications Command, but adds the mission of the Headquarters, Naval Communications Command, that is, "to assist the Commander, Naval Communications Command in accomplishing his mission."

Although the SECNAV NOTICES were issued in 1967, the complete mission and functions statement for COMNAVCOMM was not forthcoming





until mid-1971, over four years later. Perhaps this extraordinary delay is due to the fact that a larger reorganization of the office of the CNO was underway. One of the significant developments of this reorganization affecting Naval Communications was the establishment of the Command Support Programs office which incorporated a communications division, intelligence division, reconnaissance, surveillance and flag plot division, signal exploitation and security division and a meteorology division. Obviously under such a comprehensive shake-up it would take some time for a finalized mission and functions definition to be promulgated. In any event on 3 May 1971, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5450.184 was issued giving a modified mission to Commander, Naval Communications Command. According to this instruction [Ref. 30] he was now to be the:

"Executive Manager throughout the Department of the Navy to provide, operate and maintain adequate and secure naval communications and to ensure their readiness and operating efficiency to support requirements for command and control and information transfer systems of the operating forces and shore establishment of the Department of the Navy; to be the Navy Operating Manager for the operation and maintenance support of those elements of the Defense Communications System assigned to the Navy; to command and support the Naval Communications Command and such other activities and resources as may be assigned."



### III. THE EXECUTIVE MANAGER

#### A. DEFINITION

A single concise definition of the term "Executive Manager" has not been found. Taken separately the words can be defined. Webster defines "executive" as "a person, group of people, or branch of government empowered and required to administer the laws and affairs of a nation" or "any person whose function is to administer or manage affairs, as of a corporation, school, etc." and a "manager" as "a person who manages." JCS Pub 1, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, does not define either "executive" or "manager" but does define an "Executive Agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff" as "A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to whom they have assigned responsibility and delegated authority which would otherwise be exercised by them collectively, to carry out for them certain of their duties." JCS Pub 1 also defines a "coordinating authority" as "A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions of activities. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement, he shall refer the matter to the appointing authority."

The OPNAV Organization Manual has an associated glossary which defines an "Executive Agency" as the "Department or other administrative unit which holds a position of administrative or managerial responsibility." The term "manager" is defined as "to direct, plan, develop,



organize, guide, coordinate, and control all aspects of execution and all resources available to achieve objectives. To administer in the broadest sense of overall control. (This verb implies responsibility for all aspects of an operation or activity.)"

Still, a question remains. Where does the executive find himself in the organization? Civilian managers seem to like to call themselves executives when they are still early in their careers. Dalton McFarland [Ref. 12, p. 71] clearly points out the problem when he states:

"The terms manager, executive, administrator, entrepreneur, and businessman refer to closely related concepts. So closely are the concepts related, in fact, that some of the terms are used interchangeably despite technical differences among them. None of the terms have precise, universal definitions at present. The terms are so imprecise that it is virtually impossible to obtain an accurate count of the number of persons in different categories."

McFarland goes on to state that the main prevalent distinction among the three terms, "manager," "executive," and "administrator" are in the level and type of organization in which the usage occurs. He also states that even these distinctions are not clearcut and that the concepts of the executive and the administrator both imply policy-formulation levels.

It is clear from extensive reading of current management literature and military instructions that an "Executive Manager", per se, is nowhere defined. The best that can be done then is to develop a concept of an Executive Manager based on what is available. This concept must include an element of delegated authority, which cuts across established organizational lines, near top-level or policy formulating level positioning and responsibility for the administration of all aspects of an operation



or activity. Using this concept of the Executive Manager it is now appropriate to examine the need for such an individual with regard to Naval Communications.

## B. NEED

Although the needs for increased emphasis on communications management were previously discussed it would be well to again review these needs as they relate to the role of Executive Manager.

The establishment of a telecommunications advisor in the office of the President and the establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Telecommunications demonstrate a trend toward centralizing management. These centralized managers reflect the concern over communications matters which is found at the highest levels of the Executive and Legislative branches of government. This interest requires a positive identification of all communications resources. Unfortunately communications responsibilities in the Navy are so scattered that attempts to identify communications resources to date have not been noted for their success. For example on 21 May 1970, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard established the Office of Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications.)<sup>1</sup> Mr. Packard testified before the House Armed Services Investigating committee [Ref. 19, p. 17] that:

"Shortly after he took office, he became aware that the Department of Defense had a serious problem in the management of

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<sup>1</sup> Later raised to the status of Assistant Secretary Vice Assistant to the Secretary.





communications. He found responsibility fragmented, and a need for centralized authority and control of resources. He said there was no place where he could learn how much was being spent on communications, and that there was no appropriate means for coordinating the substantial portion of communications under control of the military departments."

One of the problems is to account for the costs of the communications integral to a weapons system. The House Armed Services Investigating Committee report states the services were unable to "even approximate" the cost of communications delivered with a weapons system. The report states [Ref. 19, p. 21] "six billion dollars for total communications costs is much more realistic than the three billion dollar figure usually cited by the Department of Defense" and that "loose management practices in the Department of Defense resulted in a complete loss of control over communications assets."

The fact that responsibility for communication is fragmented was recognized by the CNO Industrial Advisory Committee on Telecommunications (CIACT.) As part of their report issued in 1972 [Ref. 22, p. i], this high level committee of civilian and military officials stated that:

"The Navy's communications problems cannot be successfully solved without first addressing this fragmentation. The responsibility for all aspects of communications, ashore, on-board, and between platforms should be consolidated and concentrated, for the office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), in a Director of Naval Telecommunications (DNT); and, for the Office of the Chief of Naval Material (NAVMAT), in the Commander Naval Electronics Systems Command (NAVELEX)."

Clearly these problem areas demonstrate the need for an Executive Manager for Naval Communications. The fact that such an individual has not been previously designated seems to be one of the most obvious



reasons for the condition in which naval communications exists today.

A member of COMNAVCOMM staff likened it to a corporation ripe for takeover by a conglomerate -- plenty of assets, offering a necessary service, but badly mismanaged.

The term "Executive Manager" has been discussed. While no clear concise meaning has been given to the term, a working concept has been developed. Using this concept the need for an Executive Manager has been set forth. At this point, a closer look at the various military organizations for communications should assist in fixing in mind where an office such as this should be established.



#### IV. COMMUNICATIONS ORGANIZATIONS

##### A. THE PRESENT NAVY ORGANIZATION

To illustrate the fragmentation referred to in the previous section it will be necessary to discuss the present organization of the Navy for communications.

The CNO staff (OPNAV) is organized in a matrix fashion. Vertical platform sponsors such as OP-02, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Submarine Warfare), OP-03, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Surface Warfare), and OP-05, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare) intermesh with horizontal "mission sponsors such as OP-93, Director of Tactical Electro-magnetic Programs, OP-094, Director Command Support Programs, OP-095, Director of Antisubmarine Warfare Programs and OP-098, Director of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation."

Acting for the Director, Command Support Programs (OP-094), the Director, Naval Communications Division is assigned the mission to exercise centralized supervision and direction of the telecommunications activities of the Navy; and to serve under the Director, Command Support Programs as the principal staff advisor and provide support to CNO on matters pertaining to telecommunications. Currently the OP-02, OP-03, OP-05, OP-093 and OP-095 missions also include the authority and responsibility for telecommunications involved in their platforms and systems. For example, one of OP-02's functions states [Ref. 23, p. 02-6] that he, "Determines requirements, coordinates with and provides



guidance to the Director, Command Support Programs, OP-094, and other OPNAV offices on command and control of, and communications systems associated with, submarine forces and programs."

This obviously places OP-02 in a prominent position in communications. However, a fine line of distinction exists between his mission and that of COMNAVCOMM. Acting in this capacity as a member of CNO's staff, OP-02 is dealing in operational requirements for communications. The distinction becomes clear when it is observed that according to his charter [Ref. 23, p. 094-22] OP-941 "assesses requirements" and "plans for the satisfaction of current and future telecommunications requirements."

Similar tasking involving communications can be found in the mission and functions statements of other OPNAV staff members. OP-098 is charged [Ref. 23, p. 098-23] to sponsor "jointly with the Director, Naval Communications Division, OP-941, a Satellite Communications Program Coordinator who is a focal point for all Navy efforts in the satellite communications field and also to "carry out the responsibilities of the Director, RDT&E for R&D matters related to communications, cryptology, and the radio frequency spectrum."

Without any reference to the responsibility or authority of OP-094 in communications matters, OP-093 is charged with the "coordination of TF/TG level command, control and communications requirements." A subordinate, OP-931, is tasked [Ref. 23, p. 093-5] to develop a Navy-wide Tactical Electro-magnetic Plan which will guide the integration of





weapon systems, sensor systems, electronic warfare systems, tactical command and control and communications systems into an effective task force system.

It seems reasonably clear that the intent of the words is to place responsibility for stating operational requirements, that is need lines, with other mission and platform sponsors but to leave the matter of deciding how these requirements are to be satisfied with OP-094. However, the old story of giving an inch and taking a mile is no where better evidenced than here. The CIACT report [Ref. 22, p. 27] states that this division of responsibility and authority of OPNAV "encourages the independent design, development, and implementation of separate and frequently incompatible communications systems and subsystems."

The director, Naval Communications Division (OP-941) also serves as Commander, Naval Communications Command, reporting directly to the CNO in this capacity. Other members of OP-941 staff are "double-hatted" to COMNAVCOMM staff. In the report of inspection of the Headquarters Naval Communications Command in 1969 [Ref. 26, p. 1], the Navy Inspector General stated "the double-hatting of OP-094 and COMNAVCOMM has led to reduced effectiveness of the Naval Communications Command. This double-hatted relationship, combined with the physical proximity of these two organizations, has resulted in COMNAVCOMM's over involvement in day-to-day OP-094 staff work. In fact, in many areas OP-094 is using COMNAVCOMM's Headquarters as an extension of the staff of OP-094."



The CIIACT found the same condition three years later and their report [Ref. 22, p. 28] states, "the double hatting creates a situation whereby NAVCOMMCOM is employed as an extension of the OPNAV (OP-941) staff. This detracts from the objectivity and responsiveness of each group and reduces the effectiveness of both groups."

Commander, Naval Communications Command is delegated command and support responsibilities for Naval Communications Stations and Units, Radio Stations and Communications Technical Groups. However, his control over even these elements is not total. Authoritative direction and control of naval communications broadcasts, ship/shore, air/ground, and other designated tactical communications functions performed by activities of the Naval Communications Command is assigned to the Fleet Commanders in Chief. This authoritative direction and control involves the adequacy of the communications arrangements, the effectiveness of the service rendered, and the responsiveness in satisfying the operating requirements of the Operating Forces. COMNAVCOMM does not have a representative assigned to the staff of the Fleet Commanders to assist in this and there is no COMNAVCOMM field organization.

In addition to the communications stations and units, a large number of communications facilities have been developed and are operated outside the direct control of COMNAVCOMM. They include Tactical Support Centers (TSC), Operational Control Centers (OCC), Naval Weather Service facilities and Naval Air Station communications facilities.



Responsibility for communications matters is also found in several areas and levels throughout the Naval Material Command. Shore communications responsibilities are assigned to Naval Electronics Systems Command. Responsibility for airborne communications system design, development, and acquisition is assigned to Naval Air Systems Command. Responsibility for shipboard systems is split between Naval Ships System Command and Naval Electronic Systems Command. At the same time, COMNAVCOMM is given the mission to "provide . . . Naval Communications." Taken in the literal sense this seems to imply involvement to some degree in equipment design, development and procurement areas. As the CIACT report [Ref. 22, p. 29] states, "Concentration of communications material matters in a single organization is essential for properly controlled R&D and acquisition, and to prevent wastefully redundant effort and proliferation of non-compatible subsystems and equipments."

Communications research and development is carried out by a number of offices scattered throughout the Navy and by certain civilian contractors. Prominent in this effort, are the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research and Development), Office of the Director, Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (OP-098) on CNO's staff, Naval Electronics Laboratory Center (NELC) and Naval Research Laboratory. OP-094 is tasked to advise OP-098 of the requirements for research, development, test and evaluation relating to Command Support Programs and to ensure that the resulting systems are adequate and responsive to long range objectives, immediate requirements, and fiscal limitations and advancing



technology. COMNAVCOMM is tasked to initiate action to include naval communications requirements in the Navy Planning and Programming System, including the research and development effort. The Naval Electronics Laboratory Center is designated the Navy's "lead laboratory" for communications, but it only has a small portion of the total effort. It is obvious that as a result of overlapping tasking and fragmented responsibilities communications systems have developed which are not compatible and not responsive to Navy needs.

Figure 1, illustrates the command relationships involved in navy communications. Of interest are the multitude of commands involved and the fact that COMNAVCOMM, the designated Executive Manager for Naval Communications throughout the Department of the Navy is really isolated. His lines of communication to most of the elements involved are not direct. As a result it is not difficult to see how confusion as to the pre-dominance of his position has developed.

## B. ARMY AND AIR FORCE

The Army Strategic Communications Command was established on 1 March 1964 by Department of the Army General Order #6 of 28 February 1964, to engineer, install, operate and maintain communications for the Army and for other agencies, as directed by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army. The Commanding General, STRATCOM commands the U. S. Army Strategic Communications Command from Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and is responsible directly to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army. STRATCOM








Figure 1. Navy Communications Command Relationships



maintains a sizeable subordinate field organization, with subordinate STRATCOM elements double-hatted with operational Army components down to the theater level.

The Air Force Communications Service was established 1 July 1961 and is designated as a "Major Air Command." The Air Force Communications Service with headquarters at Richards-Gebaur AFB, Missouri is organized to provide, operate and maintain communications and flight facilities and to provide air traffic control services for the Air Force and other agencies as directed by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force. The Commander, Air Force Communications Service reports directly to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force. Again, as with the Army, the Air Force Communications Service maintains a sizeable field organization with subordinate AFCS elements generally double-hatted with operational Air Force components down to the squadron level.

Both AFCS and STRATCOM utilize their large field organizations as a mechanism to ensure responsiveness to their operational component commanders. The USAF appears to carry their double-hatted arrangement further down the chain of command than the Army. Neither the Army nor the Air Force double-hats the Commander of their communications organizations with the position of staff communications-electronics officer on the Army and Air Force Staffs despite the general double-hatting down the line.

Both the Army and the Air Force have integral to their communications organizations, an extensive material capability. For example the



engineering and installation role in the Air Force was recently combined with the operation and maintenance role by removing the USAF Ground Engineering Installation Agency from the Air Force Logistics Command and merging it into the Air Force Communications Service. STRATCOM has a subordinate organization, the Communications Electronics Engineering Installation Agency (CEEIA) located at Fort Huachuca to provide centralized control of STRATCOM's global engineering and installation activities.

Clearly, the Army and Air Force organizations are considerably different from the Navy organization. The idea of extension of the command through the double-hatted lower eschelons is in sharp contrast to the Washington based headquarters concept of the Navy. Additionally, the Army and Air Force organizations, located as they are outside the Washington area seem to enjoy the prestige of an autonomous command. Something that apparently Headquarters, NAVCOMMCOM does not.



## V. AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY RELATIONSHIPS

### A. AUTHORITY

Before proceeding into the relationships between authority and responsibility, it would first be helpful to examine the current textbook viewpoints concerning the source of authority. One of the earliest writers in the field of management, Henri Fayol, defined authority as the right to give orders and the power to exact obedience. He distinguished between official authority, which is based on the office a person holds and personal authority which is based on the office holder's own personality, experience and other personal characteristics which influence his subordinates. Current writers generally concur that authority in bureaucratic organizations is inherent to the position in the organization and not in the person who fills the position. However, some disagreement has developed on the matter of the source of authority with some experts adhering to the formal authority theory and others to an acceptance theory. Formal theorists consider authority to have its origins in basic social behavior -- groups form laws, mores, and customs to routinize their continued existence. Social institutions develop to carry out this routinized behavior. Formal authority is the right these social institutions confer on individuals to manage the political, economic, religious or educational institution concerned. Under this concept in the United States, authority is ultimately traced back to the Constitution.

The acceptance theory of authority states that the real source of a manager's authority is the acceptance by subordinates of the power a





manager holds over them. This theory is generally attributed to Chester Bernard and it is his position that a subordinate will accept the authority of a command if he understands it, if he believes it is consistent with the organization's purpose and compatible with his own interests, and if he is mentally and physically able to comply with it.

Not all management experts accept this theory. Koontz and O'Donnell [Ref. 11, p. 59] take the position that:

"The very fact that some of the most important advantages of accepting, and disadvantages of not accepting, authority arise from the manager's power to grant or with-hold rewards or, to dismiss the subordinate, makes the theory unreal. The soldier's obedience to commands -- because the alternative is the guardhouse or the firing squad -- is hardly genuine acceptance, nor is acceptance more genuine where a civilian's acceptance alternative is to quit his job or be fired."

In the case at hand however, where lateral relationships abound more so than classical line command relationships and where the problem is one of establishing the authority of COMNAVCOMM through these lateral relationships the question of acceptance really is noticeable. Obviously COMNAVCOMM can't fire the Chief of Naval Material or Commander, Naval Electronics System Command. He must gain their acceptance of his authority none the less.

The fact that lateral acceptance of authority is a problem is observed in the following quotation from an article concerning the formation of the Command Support Programs office [Ref. 18].

"As with any bureaucratic reorganization, the shift was not entirely painless. "There were some cries of outrage," one observer said. "Some of the admirals in charge of certain elements had their own budgets and didn't like people from the new organization threatening their control."



"We've had to go around and take a few grains of rice from everybody's bowl and some of them were inclined to break our chopsticks when we went after their rice."

It is inevitable that as COMNAVCOMM exerts the authority of an Executive Manager for Naval Communications throughout the Department of the Navy he will encounter similar problems.

## B. RESPONSIBILITY

Basically two schools of thought exist with regard to responsibility. One holds that responsibility means the work or duties someone is to accomplish and that superiors can and do delegate responsibility when they assign work. The other school holds that responsibility is the obligation of a subordinate to perform assigned and implied duties and that responsibility can never be delegated. The obvious problem in understanding this concept is that if responsibility cannot be delegated how does anyone below the highest level attain it? The answer is that responsibility is an obligation. As duties are assigned, authority is passed on and this generates its own responsibilities. The sense of being accountable for action.

This approach follows the concept of responsibility which is inculcated in naval officers. For example the captain of a ship may authorize certain officers to perform action such as operation and maintenance of the engineering plant or conning the ship but he retains the responsibility for the proper execution of these functions -- he is still responsible and accountable to the commodore. In this light then, what of the authority



and responsibility that is involved with the "Executive Manager" for naval communications.

An interesting and important insight into use of the term "Executive Manager" and the authority and responsibility relationships it implies is found in SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5400.13 of 24 August 1971. This instruction has as its subject "Assignment and Distribution of Authority and Responsibility for the Administration of the Department of the Navy." One section of this instruction lists those offices which are considered to deal with Executive Administration. They include, the Secretary of the Navy, the Civilian Executive Assistants to the Secretary, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps., the Chief of Naval Material, the Chief of Naval Personnel, the Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, the Chief of Naval Research, the Judge Advocate General, the Deputy Comptroller of the Navy, and the Staff Assistants to the Secretary. The instruction specifically states that the term "Navy Department" refers to the central executive offices of the Department of the Navy located at the seat of the government. The instruction goes on to state that the Navy Department is organizationally composed of the above listed offices. The Commander, Naval Communications Command is not mentioned. In fact the word "communications" is used only one time when it is stated that the Chief of Naval Operations shall exercise overall authority throughout the Department of the Navy in matters essential to naval military administration such as security, intelligence, discipline, and communications.



This presents some interesting questions. Since this instruction post dates OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5450.184, is the assignment of an Executive Manager in that instruction misplaced? Does the Chief of Naval Operations have the authority to name an eschelon two commander an "Executive Manager" throughout the Department of the Navy? If it was the intent of the Secretary of the Navy that Commander, Naval Communications Command be included in Executive Administration of the Navy as some other eschelon two commanders were, then why didn't the mission statement of SECNAV NOTICE 5450 of 19 April 1967 contain the term Executive Manager or why was Commander, Naval Communications Command not specifically referred to, as some other eschelon two commanders were in SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5400.13?

Only one other case has been located where the authority to act as an Executive Manager has been delegated. This is the case of the Executive Manager for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology and Training (OP-03X.) The mission of this officer on OPNAV staff clearly states [Ref. 23, p. 03-15] that he is to:

"...act under the authority of and be responsible to the Secretary of the Navy through the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Surface Warfare) for the implementation of the responsibilities of the Secretary of the Navy in all matters pertaining to his assignment as Single Manager for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology and Training within the Department of Defense."

The main point to be observed here is that an "Executive Manager" has been established to carry out an activity for the Secretary of the Navy. Although not specifically referred to in SECNAV INSTRUCTION





5400.13 the assignment of an Executive Manager in the OPNAV staff appears to be consistent with that instruction since the Chief of Naval Operation is considered to be involved in Executive Administration, and OP-03X's mission states he is responsible to the Secretary of the Navy. His positioning, and the clear mission he is assigned, would seem to make it easier for him to attain acceptance of his authority.



## VI. CONCLUSIONS

The need for some form of overall management of naval communications has been discussed. It has been observed that numerous elements and levels of command in the Navy provide some form of input into the total communications picture and that as a result of this fragmentation the resulting communications are not always responsive to the needs of the operating forces. It appears that despite the development of the Command Support Programs office it is still the intention of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations that there be separate centralized management of communications matters.

While it is the conclusion of this thesis that such management is necessary, it is also concluded that the term Executive Manager as presently assigned to COMNAVCOMM does not conform to the concepts for assignment and distribution of authority and responsibility as defined in SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5400.13. Two alternative solutions are available. One involves moving the Executive Manager to the eschelon one level -- removing the title from COMNAVCOMM and placing it with OP-941. This is not considered acceptable since it will impose, unnecessarily, operation and maintenance functions on OPNAV staff. It should be the function of this staff to deal in requirements -- a course setting, directive approach.

The second alternative involves drastic modification of COMNAVCOMM's position. The double-hatting of OP-941 and COMNAVCOMM



should be ended. Naval Communications Command, Headquarters should be removed from the Washington D. C. area to lessen the tendency of that headquarters to become an extension of OP-941. Subordinate field headquarters should be established similar to the Army and Air Force concept to avail COMNAVCOMM the opportunity of on the spot visibility, decision-making and authority.

Finally, SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5400.13 should be modified to indicate the role COMNAVCOMM is to play in Executive Administration of the Department of the Navy. Communications pervades all levels, all areas of modern naval operations and as a result the Executive Manager for Naval Communications should be given proper recognition and support by including COMNAVCOMM in Executive Administration of the Department of the Navy.



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The Commander Naval Communications Command has been designated as the Executive Manager for Naval Communications throughout the Department of the Navy. None the less mere designation has not gained complete acceptance or understanding of his role. At least part of the problem appears to be the title "Executive Manager" itself. This thesis attempts to define that title and explore the authority and responsibility relationships inherent or implied in such a title.

The thesis discusses a brief history of communications management, defines the term "Executive Manager" and describes the need for such an individual in the Navy. The present organization for communications in the Navy is contrasted with Army and Air Force organizations. Finally the authority and responsibility relationships are discussed and conclusions are drawn which describe what is considered to be the best form and positioning for an Executive Manager.





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